The enlargement of the EU has implications for the national defence requirements and therefore national defence policy of European nations. In light of the freedom of movement of citizens between member states it is appropriate to consider the im- 
Introduction
The expansion of the EU has to an extent changed the way member (and non-member) states need to address questions of national defence and security. The protection afforded to EU members should imply that the sums of military expenditure necessary at a national level are reduced. However General Moschini (chairman of the EU Military Committee) recently observed 1 that for the time being however, "each nation wants to keep, for political reasons, a complete structure of defence, in order to be strategically autonomous, sometimes according to old-fashioned territorial concepts." Hence the current low efficiency of national defence expenditure and the duplication of structures at national level which should be avoided. His colleague Nick Witney (European Defence Agency) 2 agreed that there was evidence of too much duplication of effort across Europe, even though Europeans accounted for a quarter of the world military expenditure the combined EU R&D budget was five times less than the amount spent by the US 3 .
Efficient national defence spending is necessary and is undertaken at the expense of expenditure in other areas of the economy. Thus the further expansion of the EU and the freedom of movement for its people has implications for the migration flows. Spending a relatively high proportion of national GDP on national defence is likely to cause migration with far reaching defence and other implications for the source and host countries within the EU. There are many reasons that prompt migration. Traditionally theory suggests that these include wages and employment levels.
Given the impact of military expenditure on growth and freedom of movement of population of EU member states we test to see whether the ratio of military expenditure to GDP in the host and the source country has an impact on migration and find that the military expenditure of both the source and the host nation have an impact on migration.
Military expenditure of the source country has a positive impact on migration, whereas military expenditure of the foreign country has a negative impact. 2 At the same press conference. 3 However the level of national military expenditure has often been a proxy for the prospect of conflict.
That is, the amount of military expenditure will increase as the prospect of conflict. For example Turkey has high levels of military expenditure as a result of the conflict with Greece over Cyprus.
We construct a panel data set of countries that are either members of the EU, acceding countries, candidate countries or potential candidates. This is done in order to consider However it is likely that the relationship is more complex then previously suggested in the literature as military expenditure may be a proxy for conflict. That is it is likely to be high and/ or increased in regions where the prospect of conflict is high or increasing.
The paper proceeds with an outline of the European Security and Defence arrange-ments in section 2 and a review of the literature in section 3. A discussion of the model used, its specification and the characteristics of the data set used in the estimations are presented in section 4. The results of the dynamic panel estimations are presented in section 5 with the policy implications of these results discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
European Security and Defence
One of the great political objectives of Europe is to maintain its stability with a solid security framework. is appended to the Constitutional Treaty currently in the consultation phase. The role of the WEU as the acting inter-parliamentary platform for the ESDP on the basis of the parliamentary instruments for which the WEU legal framework makes provision will be largely obsolete with the advent of the European Constitutional Treaty 14 . The Treaty is intended to promote confidence in the EU provision for its members and therefore encourage economic growth.
Military Expenditure and Growth
The 14 The Constitutional Treaty includes a solidarity clause giving member states the possibility to request aid and assistance from the other EU countries in the event of a terrorist attack. There is also a non-binding mutual defence clause. 15 The growth literature has typically focused on long term growth of output rather than the short term effects.
expenditures to external debt but not vice versa 16 And in more recent work Karagol (2006) finds that the defence expenditures have a positive effect on external debt stock. Impulse response functions of GNP to defence expenditures tended to hike within two years ahead and dipped sharply by two years and thereafter continued at a positive level.
In Europe, there is evidence that military expenditures are often used as a variable of economic adjustment and that inertia effects are important. Coulomb and Fontanel(2005) find that since 1990 French military expenditures are more of an economic burden than a driving force. This may in part be due to their procurement procedure. Dunne et al (forthcoming) show how concentration depends on willingness of producers to import their military needs and on relative size of external market of non-producers. They find substantial gains to producers from cooperation in procurement process and small gains to non-producers involved in regional arms race. Also arms export control that the limit level of technology that can be exported to non-producers distribute these cooperative gains from producers to non-producers.
In other parts of the world Yildirim and Ocal (2006) A bidirectional causal relationship exists in the long run between defence spending and GDP in Taiwan implying that increasing defence spending in Taiwan is an effective means to boost overall economic performance and the improved economy leads to further defence expenditure. However defence spending is a major means of adjusting for disequilibria that occur in the system.
The military burden does indeed have a positive impact on the share of external debt to GDP in small industrializing countries (Dunne et al, 2004a) . However, there is no evidence that the military burden had any impact on the evolution of debt in Argentina and Brazil but some evidence that military burden tended to increase debt in Chile (Dunne et al, 2004b) . Chile was the least affected by acute financial crisis resulting from debt problems although its relative levels of debt were as high or higher. Suggesting that the military burden maybe important in determining debt in countries but it is only of significance when it is not swamped by other macroeconomic and international factors. The arms race effect was found to affect countries long run growth. Ihori (2004) finds the ratio of security spending to GDP increases with economic growth if defence technology has a fixed benefit.
Even in the US, Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2004) found evidence of the level dependent effect of military expenditure on GDP growth. The positive externality effect of defence spending prevails for relatively lower levels of defence spending and reverts its influence for higher levels.
A large literature then exists on the impact of military expenditure on growth with evidence that there are short-term positive demand effects, but adverse long-term effects.
Standard migration theory would then suggest indirect effect on migration through changes in relative income. Little work has been done in this area, however, on CEEC's and to the best of our knowledge no study exists on the direct effect of military expenditure on migration flows. This the focus for the rest of the paper.
The Model and Data
We model the long-term relationship between the stock of migrants, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, and a measure of military expenditure as a proportion of GDP. We assume (as McCormick et al., 2002 ) that the rate of change in the stock of migrants or the share of the population which already resides in the foreign countries is determined by the economic variables such as, the difference in the log of per capita incomes and the employment rates in the foreign and the home countries.
In this study we attempt to identify the factors that trigger migration to Germany and especially focus on the role that military expenditures might play in the decision to migrate. We focus on the impact that the prospect of conflict has as the main factor prompting national military expenditure. The model presented here relies on the work of Hatton (1995) and McCormick et al. (2002) and is based on the premise that migration is an investment in human capital, the returns to which are determined by expectations of future income. These expectations of income in the country of destination are conditioned by the perceived opportunity to find a job in its labour market (McCormick et al., 2002) .
We augment the standard migration model by considering military expenditures in the home and the foreign countries as possible determinants of migration.
Theory suggests that migration is determined by the income differential between the host and the source country, as well as the employment rates in the host and the source countries. The income differential between the host and the source country, and the conditions in the labour market of the host country described by its employment rate, would be expected to have a positive impact on migration, while the conditions in the labour market of the source country would intuitively be expected to have a negative impact. We anticipate that military expenditures in the source countries will boost migration signifying a positive migration-military expenditure relationship. On the other hand, military expenditures of the host country are expected to manifest a negative nexus with the potential to migrate. Therefore, our model is of the following form:
where the annual change in the ratio of the stock of migrants to the source population is, ∆SM i,t . The differential in real wages, which is proxied by the annual change in the difference of the GDP per capita at current prices in US dollars between the host and the source country, ∆ln
. Employment opportunities as proxied by the annual change in the employment rate (1-unemployment rate) in the host country, ∆ln(E F ) i,t , and the source country, ∆ln(E H ) i,t . The value of the difference of the GDP per capita between the host and the source country lagged one year, ln
. The value of the employment rate lagged one year in the host country, ln(E F ) i,t−1 , and the source country, ln(E H ) i,t−1 .
The lagged by one year value of military expenditures over GDP at current prices in US dollars for the source country,
, and the host country,
. And δ are unknown constant parameters to be estimated, F denotes the foreign or host country,
H the home or source country, and ε is an unobserved spherical disturbance term.
This model is able to capture both short and long run effects as it includes variables specified both in the level, lagged and others, which are first differenced. We use a variety of data sources to construct the necessary variables. Data on GDP per capita at current prices in millions US dollars and total population come from the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database maintained by the United Nations The average values for the main aggregates by country are set out in Table 1 .
Results of Dynamic Panel Estimation
The parameters of equation (1) to ensure unbiased and consistent estimates it is important to ensure that the differenced equations are free from second or higher order autocorrelation. The estimation process is carried out in two stages and from the first stage inferences can be drawn about the coefficients and the second for inferences on model specification.
Initially we test the factors that traditionally are thought to influence the levels of migration. The results of regression 1 in Table 2 show that those variables traditionally thought to influence migration; the employment opportunities in both the source and the host country, as well as the ratio of GDP per capita all do significantly influence migration. This suggests that those who migrate may do so because their standard of living is affected by the level of military expenditure as a proportion of GDP consider where they will go and will be unlikely to choose a host country that has a higher level of military expenditure as a proportion of its GDP than the source country. Indeed the size of the impact of military expenditure on the decision to migrate is larger for the host country's expenditure than that for the source country. 19 The hypothesis test results presented at the bottom of Table 2 confirms that the impact of miliary expenditure in the host and the source countries are important factors affecting migration. The null hypothesis that military expenditure of the home and the host countries has no impact is rejected as δ 8 and δ 9 are not statistically equal to zero (implying that they both have some impact), nor are they statistically equal to each other.
To determine the impact of the factors in the host and the source country the Wilcoxon
Test is used to test the hypothesis that the various factors in each country have identical median values and identical distributions. The results presented in Table 3 Our results indicate that an increase in military expenditure has triggered migration flows to Germany as aggregate consumption has decreased due to the increased military expenditure which is financed by public funds. This result is of special importance for Turkey.
Annually, Turkey is obliged to incur high military costs due to its strategic position in Eastern Europe, which is driven by NATO commitments, fears of Islamic fundamentalism, the desire to suppress Kurdish militants and disagreements with Greece (Brauer, 2001 ).
In contrast, member states' whose military expenditure did not differ significantly from the expenditure of other Eastern European countries during the communist era will not be as affected.
Our results show that based on the current amount of military expenditure of the countries in the sample if that military expenditure of the source country has a 2% impact on the stock of migrants. Our results imply that on average if military expenditure of the 16 source countries considered in our analysis were increase by 50% then there would be an average increase in the migrant stock per population of 3%. If however military expenditure of these countries were to be cut by 50% there would be a fall in the stock of migrants of 1%. This implies that on average there would be no migrant stock of people wanting to migrate to Germany in 12 out of the 16 countries we considered if military expenditure of these countries were to be cut in half. Only Croatia (3.62%), Macedonia (1.35%), Serbia and Montenegro (5.64%) and Turkey (2%) would have a migrant stock wanting to move to Germany. On average whilst these countries have amongst the highest average rates of unemployment, they are not the top 4 on the list in Table 1 . In terms of GDP per capita these countries although amongst the lowest, do not exhibit the lowest percentage in the sample. In terms of military expenditure as a proportion of GDP;
Croatia has the highest at 5%, Turkey 4.6%, Macedonia 2.93%. Others over 2% including Romania (2.65%) and Cyprus (2.63%) have low migrant stocks per population therefore the reason for high migrant stock of these four Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey (after a 50% reduction in military expenditure) maybe due to the populations perceived threat of conflict. Thus the results on average reflect the unrest of the countries (decrease in the quality of living due to fear of war) rather than the impact that military expenditure has on GDP and growth (standards of living).
We have focused on the impact of a change in the source countries military expenditure,
we turn now to consider the impact of a change in the military expenditure of the host country (Germany). Our results show that if the host country was to increase its military expenditure by 50% the stock of migrants would fall by 105%, that is, no longer would it be a destination of choice for migrants from CEEC's but also there would be Germans wanting to leave Germany to live elsewhere. Conversely, if Germany, the host country were to reduce it's military expenditure by 50% on average the migration stock would double. That is, assuming the status quo remains our results indicate that the migrant stock will be reduced by 70%. When military expenditure is halved so too is the impact on the migrant stock and at that level of military expenditure as a proportion of GDP only 35% of people remain in the stock -implying that 35% of people wishing to migrate has been reduced by 35%. Half the migrant stock has been turned away from migrating to the host country. This implies that the decision to migrate is calculated and migrants do not want to move from one country to another when they perceive their standard of living to be compromised. Instead migrants will only want to go when the perceived prospects are improved.
Policy Implications -Military Expenditure and Migration
The expansion of the EU to date 20 has prompted (or is likely to prompt) migration from accession countries to those in the West to be more intense due to the agreement of free movement of workers among the countries of the European Union (Drinkwater et al., 2002) .
As a consequence, a deterioration of living standards of unskilled workers in conjunction with job displacement and wage losses triggered by the inflow of low-cost labour and the de-localization of plants from the West to the East is feared (Boeri and Brucker, 2001 ).
Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) predict long run migration rates to potentially be between 2 -3 percent of the population of the source country. However, these migration rates are likely to fall as living standards in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
improve (Drinkwater et al, 2002) . Rights and privileges afforded to EU members mean that the amount of national military expenditure that is necessary has changed and this has implications for alternatives that the money can be used for and therefore perceived standards of living.
Clearly our results suggest that national military expenditure has an impact on migration stock. Therefore public policy needs to account for this fact with appropriate national or EU military expenditure, measures to deal with migration flows or some combination of these. We have considered what would happen on average to the migration stock under a number of alternative scenarios 22 . Our results suggest that a favourable policy option is likely to be to encourage a reduction in national military expenditure. A significant driver of this will hinge on the development and evolution of the ESDP and the provision of EU protection which inspires member (and non-member) confidence 23 . For candidate countries of our sample some short term migration constraints so as to avoid a large exodus of skilled and unskilled labour around the time of accession which will drain the source economy and flood the host countries.
Conclusions
The expansion of the EU has implications for the economies of both the accession countries as well as those established EU members. The agreement of free movement of workers among the countries of the EU is set to influence the labour markets in both the host and the source countries. In this paper we analyzed the determinants of international migration The migration model employed to explain migration flows from these countries to Germany is initially estimated using a dynamic panel GMM technique. In the first instance, we find that the income differential between the host and the source country is a factor in triggering migration flows, as are the labour market flows of the host country. The increasing employment rate in the host country as well as a positive difference in per capita income between host and home country increases the long-run stock of migrants.
The results so far are consistent with other modelling work done in the area of migration, the novelty of this paper however is the inclusion of a measure of military expenditure As to candidate countries Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey a reduction in military expenditure would not wipe out migrant stocks, due in part to the fear of conflict in these countries and the regions and therefore the perceived prospects for a better life in Germany. Therefore steps need to be taken to control the migration flows in the short run as and when they join the EU. This advise has been given previously in the literature in other contexts. Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999 suggest that the anticipation that migrants will move from the accession candidate countries towards the western economies, provides the opportunity for the imposition of a temporary restriction of migration flows in terms of a Common EU migration policy. Notes: Unemployment rates, stock of migrants over total population, and military expenditure over GDP appear in percentage terms, while GDP per capita is expressed in current US dollars. F H H ME ME = -9.46 (0.00)
Notes:
The null hypothesis is that, for every given pair, the associated factors between the foreign and the home countries are of equal impact. 
